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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Margaret J. Abney 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
June 2013 
 
Title: Avoiding the Arab Spring? The Politics of Legitimacy in King Mohammed VI’s 
Morocco 
 
 
During the 2011 Arab Spring protests, the Presidents of Egypt and Tunisia lost 
their seats as a result of popular protests.  While protests occurred in Morocco during the 
same time, King Mohammed VI maintained his throne.  I argue that the Moroccan king 
was able to maintain his power because of factors that he has because he is a king.  These 
benefits, including dual religious and political legitimacy, additional control over the 
military, and a political situation that make King Mohammed the center of the Moroccan 
political sphere, are not available to the region’s presidents. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
Ahead of the 2010 beginnings of the Arab Spring protests, Morocco faced many 
of the same political and economic conditions as other countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  However, the presence of similar conditions did not lead Morocco to have 
similar results – namely, a popular uprising that led to the stepping down of the country’s 
ruler – that was observed in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia.  The puzzle of the 
Moroccan king’s staying power leads to three questions about this outcome as of late-
2011, at which point it had become clear that the king survived the Arab Spring 
unscathed.  1) What structural conditions were present in Morocco that made it more or 
less likely that the king would maintain power?  2) What, if any, distinctive strategies did 
King Mohammed VI use to stay in power?  3) What are the most important features of 
the Moroccan regime that help to maintain monarchical control? 
The questions posed in this study are top-down, in that they focus on the ways in 
which the king of Morocco had an impact on the political situation in his country during 
the Arab Spring protests.  There are reasons to think that, at least for an initial focus, a 
top-down approach seems justified in this case.  In comparison to other regional countries 
in which regime change did occur because of the protests, there are not obvious reasons 
to think that Moroccan society was more splintered or less able to mobilize than those 
societies that overthrew their leaders during the Arab Spring that these variables were the 
main reasons the protests failed to induce regime change.  While research about the 
strategies and shortcomings of the February 20
th
 Movement – the group of Moroccan 
protestors active during the spring of 2011 – is necessary for a fuller understanding of the 
 2 
 
events of Morocco’s Arab Spring, this study will focus primarily on the role of the king 
and the conditions present in the monarchy to answer the above questions.  This approach 
is supported by literatures on the relative weakness of and divisions within both political 
parties
1
 and Islamist opposition groups (some of whom do not necessarily advocate for 
democratic political change),
2
 as well as those literatures that focus on the centrality of 
the king within the Moroccan political sphere.
3
  A central theme of these literatures is that 
the political system and civil society are set up in such ways that make large-scale 
political change in Morocco very dependent upon the king’s participation; that is to say, 
if the king objects to a political change, his position and resources make it likely that he 
will be able to manipulate events so that change does not occur.   
While there is value in studying the reasons for the splintered nature of Moroccan 
politics and the tactical choices made by the Moroccan protestors, and to have a complete 
understanding of the events that occurred, both issues must be taken into account, the 
scope of this project means that choices must be made about which group to study.  
Focusing on the strength of the king vis-à-vis society and the policies he made to head off 
the effects of the protests is one of several viable avenues for understanding the events of 
the Arab Spring in Morocco.  I chose to focus this study on the king because of his 
documented centrality in the political system – in terms of the protests, this means that 
the king had an impact on how the protestors acted (by limiting their calls to those for a 
constitutional monarchy rather than for full regime change) as well as the outcomes of the 
protest.  Without rejecting the fact that a larger study would develop a more complete 
                                                 
1
 See Benchemsi 2012b; Hammoudi 1997; D. Maghraoui 2008; Cavatorta and Durac 2010 
 
2
 See Bellin 2005; Ottaway and Riley 2008; Joffé 2011; Cavatorta and Durac 2010 
 
3
 See Molina 2011; Brumberg 2002; Korany 1998; Herb 2004; Hammoudi 1997 
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picture of the events using several of these avenues, as matter of feasibility, focusing on 
the regime and its strategies and characteristics, rather than on the strategies and 
characteristics of the protestors, is a reasonable option. 
In the next sections of this paper, I will provide a brief overview of the uprisings 
in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco.  I will then explore the literature on authoritarian 
resilience, in order to determine what conditions, features, and strategies of regimes 
should be prevalent in a regime that withstands popular protest.  Then, I will take each of 
these groups of factors and apply them more specifically to the 2011 Moroccan context to 
determine how or whether Morocco differs from other regional countries on these factors.  
Finally, I will use these differences or similarities to test hypotheses about why the king 
of Morocco was able to stay in power while other regional rulers lost their positions 
because of the Arab Spring protests.  I will argue that King Mohammed VI was able to 
make use of features of his regime – namely, the religious and political legitimacy 
bestowed upon him because he is a monarch, not an elected president as in Tunisia and 
Egypt – to maintain his power during and after the Arab Spring protests in his country. 
 4 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE ARAB SPRING 
1. The Arab Spring: A Brief Summary 
On 17 December 2010, a college-educated fruit vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, set 
himself on fire in his hometown of Sidi Bouzi – located in central Tunisia – to protest 
mistreatment by the police and the lack of opportunity in his country.
4
  For the next few 
weeks, protests spread throughout the country with the organizing help of the Tunisian 
General Labour Union (UGTT),
5
 eventually arriving in the capital city of Tunis on 12 
January 2011.
6
  The Tunisian protestors called for the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali, who had been in power since 1987, and the ending of corrupt practices by his 
close associates.
7
  Once the protests reached the capital, Ben Ali attempted to end the 
demonstrations by offering a series of political reforms, which were seen as too little, too 
late, and by calling on the army, unsuccessfully, to use force to quiet the population.
8
  
Two days later, on 14 January, the president stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia.
9
  
The next day, the Tunisian prime minister resigned his position and new elections as well 
as a constitutional reform process were scheduled.
10
 
                                                 
4
 Noueihed and Warren 2012, 74 
 
5
 Lynch 2012, 77 
 
6
 Kirkpatrick 2011c 
 
7
 Noueihed and Warren 2012, 76 
 
8
 Lynch 2012, 79 
 
9
 Kirkpatrick 2011d 
 
10
 Kirkpatrick 2011b 
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On 25 January, inspired by the protests in Tunisia, thousands of Egyptians took 
the streets – most notably in Cairo’s Tahrir Square – to demand the end of the nearly 30-
year rule of President Hosni Mubarak.
11
  As the protests continued into February, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which had been banned from active participation in the political 
process since 2005, joined in the protests.
12
  In an attempt to stay in power, the president 
went on television on 10 February to announce that he would step down at the end of his 
term.
13
  This move angered protestors, nearly one million of whom flooded the streets of 
Cairo demanding his immediate resignation.  The next day, Mubarak fled the capital for 
his home in Sharm el-Sheik, and left his vice president to give a statement saying that 
temporary power had been handed over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to 
manage the country’s affairs until a new constitution could be written and elections could 
be held.
14
  
From 17 January until 19 February 2011, riots occurred in Tangier, Morocco, 
over high unemployment rates and increases in utility prices.
15
  Young activists used 
social media and other technologies to call for protests in the style of those that had 
occurred in Tunisia and Egypt; their Twitter hashtag (#Feb20) became the name of their 
movement: February 20 Movement.
16
  These activists began planning the protests in 
                                                 
11
 Fahim and El-Naggar 2011 
 
12
 Shane 2011 
 
13
 Fahim and Cambanis 2011 
 
14
 Kirkpatrick 2011a 
 
15
 Joffé 2011, 510 
 
16
 Lawrence 2011 
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January 2011, inspired by the fall of Tunisia’s President Ben Ali.17  Ahead of the large, 
planned protest, however, the official news agency of Morocco released a statement, 
claiming that the demonstrations had been cancelled, seemingly a ploy to limit turnout at 
these protests.
18
  This wave of protests did not have the effect the demonstrators had 
hoped for, and in fact, the February 20 protests were largely seen as a failure in their 
attempt to spark a nation-wide protest in the way that Egyptians and Tunisians had turned 
out across their countries in such large numbers.
19
 
After the protests had continued for a few weeks, on 9 March, King Mohammed 
gave a rare televised speech in which he appointed a committee to explore the 
possibilities of constitutional reform.
20
  He promised such changes as “the rule of law,” 
an “independent judiciary” and an “elected government that reflects the will of the 
people.”21  Of significance, however, is the fact that he failed to make any reference to 
the protestors; one scholar speculates that “he wanted to give the reforms a top-down 
character and insinuate that a monarch acts freely and does not bow to popular 
protests.”22  He also failed to mention the concept of a parliamentary monarchy (which 
some of the protestors had called for), but rather, he remarked, “new reforms will shore 
up the current process, thus reflecting the deep, mutual understanding and cohesion 
                                                 
17
 Rahman 2011 
 
18
 Lalami 2011a 
 
19
 Lynch 2012, 141 
 
20
 Lynch 2012, 141 
 
21
 Benchemsi 2012b, 58 
 
22
 Gallala-Arndt 2012, 142 
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between the throne and the loyal Moroccan people.”23  The next day, the king appointed 
an 18-member constitutional commission to follow through with the examination of 
possible changes promised in his speech.
24
 
As the constitutional reform process continued, so did the protests.  At the 
beginning of 2011, the protests had mostly been centered in the major cities in the 
country, such as Casablanca, Tangier and Rabat, and the protestors had been 
predominately middle class students.
25
  During March and April, however, the protests 
spread to more than 60 cities throughout Morocco and attracted a more diverse group of 
people.
26
  
At the end of April, however, the protests nearly stopped altogether, after 
terrorists attacked a popular restaurant in Marrakesh, killing over a dozen people.
27
  
Regime security forces took advantage of the situation of the violence and “call[ed] for a 
return to public order in the name of security.”28  Some members of the opposition 
accused the government of using these attacks to justify cracking down on dissent 
throughout the country; some others believed that the attacks meant that the protestors 
would not be able to push for as many reforms as they would have been able to before the 
act of terrorism.
29
  While the terror attacks halted the protests for a time, by the end of 
                                                 
23
 Lalami 2011a 
 
24
 Traub 2012 
 
25
 Lazare 2011 
  
26
 El-Din Haseeb 2011, 114 
 
27
 Lynch 2012, 141 
 
28
 Lynch 2012, 141 
 
29
 Alami 2011a 
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May, protesters were marching throughout the country in the largest demonstrations seen 
thus far.  These protests were violently broken up by police using clubs; activists estimate 
that dozens of people were injured in the city of Casablanca alone.
30
  To counter these 
protests, the king announced a snap referendum on the set of constitutional reforms.
31
 
The new constitution was released to the public on 17 June.
32
  At this time, the 
king gave a speech encouraging his citizens to vote ‘yes’ on the changes; in this speech, 
he implied that the vote would help create a solution to the conflict in Western Sahara 
and used Koranic scriptures to suggest that supporting the referendum was a religious 
duty.
33
  The king’s decision to endorse publicly the new constitution was seen by some in 
the opposition that the king was unwilling to surrender any of his power, because he was 
trying to use his popularity to influence the outcome of the election.
34
  The February 20 
Movement, joined by banned political parties of various political ideologies, encouraged 
their supporters to boycott the vote, as the amendment process had been tainted because 
“the suggested draft [was] not made up by an elected commission, but rather by people 
nominated by the king.”35  On the other hand, the country’s major political parties – the 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the conservative Istiqlal Party, and the 
Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) urged their supporters to vote ‘yes’ on 
the referendum.  Two weeks later on 1 July, the referendum to approve the document was 
                                                 
30
 Sharma 2011 
 
31
 Lynch 2012, 142 
 
32
 Traub 2012 
 
33
 Almiraat 2011 
 
34
 Alami 2011a 
 
35
 Russeau 2011 
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held; the vote passed with 98.5percent approval and 72 percent turnout, though outside 
observers note that these officially released numbers are likely highly inflated.
36
  The 
rush to the referendum was “meant to take full advantage of the monarchy’s new 
momentum” by leaving opponents little time to organize against it.37 
On 25 November, the first parliamentary elections under the new constitution 
were held; turnout was 45 percent, higher than the historically low rate of 37 percent that 
was observed in the 2007 elections.
38
  The Party of Justice and Development won a 
plurality of the seats (27 percent); their leader Abdelilah Benkirane was chosen as prime 
minister.
39
  Despite a constitutional amendment process and parliamentary elections, very 
little had changed in Morocco because of the Arab Spring protests.  The king retained – 
in fact, if not on paper – much of his power, unlike the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt. 
2. Literature Review 
The sub-sections below will examine three broad categories of arguments that 
may help to explain why the king of Morocco was able to maintain his power, while 
other leaders in the region fell to the Arab Spring protests.  These broad categories are 
structural conditions, regime features, and regime strategies and actions.  I demonstrate 
that, while it may be true that the king succeeded in holding off the effects of the protests 
observed in other countries because his regime was constructed in more robust ways, an 
understanding of the structural conditions, such as unemployment rates and a ‘youth 
bulge’ in population, will help to show that the difference in outcome in Morocco is 
                                                 
36
 Traub 2012 
 
37
 Benchemsi 2012b, 58 
 
38
 McCurdy 2011 
 
39
 McCurdy 2011 
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likely not caused by underlying structural condition.  Though the empirical subject of this 
paper is the events in Morocco, I will examine literature that discusses regime strategies 
and regime features that not just focuses on Morocco, but also on accounts that display 
regime strengths and weaknesses that come from elsewhere in the Arab world and the 
authoritarianism literature in general. 
a. Structural Conditions 
Scholars have pointed to several region-wide conditions that could explain the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring protests.  These factors set the conditions to which the 
leaders of these countries were reacting.  Among these are unemployment (particularly 
among youth), demographic challenges, fallout from economic liberalization policies, 
and government corruption.  These conditions were not confined just to one country; 
rather they were prolific across the region.  Table 2.1 below highlights some of the 
conditions facing regional countries – Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia – ahead of the 
beginning of the 2010 protests.  Of the three countries listed, two – Egypt and Tunisia – 
overthrew their presidents because of the Arab Spring protests.  In contrast, the Jordanian 
king, a pre-Arab Spring monarch, maintained his throne.  The section below examines the 
broad structural conditions that scholars have noted as being present and pertinent ahead 
of the uprisings in many countries across the Middle East and North Africa.  In chapter 
III, I will examine the same structural conditions as they pertain to the Moroccan context 
in more detail, and the actions the king took in reaction to them. 
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Table 2.1 – Structural Conditions in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia 
 Egypt Jordan Tunisia 
Youth    
Median Age 
a
 24 21 29 
% of Population under 24 
b
 53 53 40 
% of Unemployed Young Men 
c
 17 23 31 
% of Unemployed Young Women 
d
 48 46 29 
Economics    
- GDP per Capita e $2,698 $4,666 $4,194 
- Gini Coefficient f (0= most equal) 34.4 (‘05) 39.7 (‘07) 40.0 (‘01) 
- Transparency Intl g (10 = most clean) 3.1 4.7 4.3 
Development    
- HDI (2009) (1.0 = most developed) 0.638h 0.694i 0.692j 
- Internet Users (per 100 persons)k 35.6 35.7 38.8 
- Cell Phone Subscriptions  (per 100 persons)l 87 107 106 
Data is from 2010, unless otherwise noted. 
a
 Youth Unemployment in MENA, 5 
b
 Mirkin 2010 
c
 Youth Unemployment in MENA, 11 
d
 Youth Unemployment in MENA, 11 
e
 World Bank 2013a 
f
 Central Intelligence Agency 2012 
 
g
 Transparency International 2010 
h
 UNDP 2011a 
i
 UNDP 2011b 
j
 UNDP2011d 
k
 World Bank 2013b 
l
  World Bank 2013c 
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As detailed in the table above, these countries have young populations, with the 
median age of these populations being between 21-29 years old as of 2010.  Although 
there are noted discrepancies between the official unemployment rates and those 
published by non-governmental agencies (NGOs), unemployment is high for young 
people across the region, as countries struggle to deal with the results of the youth bulge, 
which included the need for more jobs than their economies were producing; strains put 
on the educational system by larger numbers of pupils; and brain drain, as educated 
young people who were frustrated with the lack of jobs in their home country migrated to 
Europe or the Gulf States.
40
  In Tunisia, for instance, more than four percent of the 
population lives in these foreign regions.
41
 
In the years preceding the Arab Spring, the countries of the Middle East and 
Northern Africa faced a youth bulge – the share of the region’s population comprised of 
youth aged 15 to 24 grew to more than 20 percent by 2010.
42
  During the same period, 
youth across the Middle East and North Africa faced unemployment rates that averaged 
25 percent.
43
  Having a college education, moreover, was not a guarantee of employment; 
in many countries throughout the region, university graduates were more likely to be 
unemployed than their lesser-educated peers.
44
  
In the years before 2010, some Arab countries cut funding for social safety net 
programs, particularly those focusing on worker training and creating jobs for new 
                                                 
40
 Mirkin 2010, 12 
 
41
 Rivlin 2007, 205 
 
42
 Mirkin 2010, 32 
 
43
 International Labour Organization 2012 
 
44
 Boudarbat and Ajbilou 2007, 17; Dhillon et al 2009, 10 
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university graduates, in favor of reducing expenditures.
45
  While unemployment was 
generally high across the Middle East and North Africa in the years leading up to the 
Arab Spring, college-educated youth faced particular hardships when it came to finding 
jobs.  For instance, in the years leading up to the protest, the Tunisian economy created 
only enough jobs to employ half of the university graduates who entered the labor 
force.
46
  This led to high levels of dissatisfaction within the country – according to a 2010 
Gallup poll, 40 percent of Tunisian youth wanted to move abroad to find work.
47
  
The economies of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia faced relatively large amounts of 
inequality and corruption.  On Transparency International’s 1-10 scale, with 10 being the 
least corrupt, all three of these countries fall below the halfway point of the rankings.
48
  
This data is supported by documents from the American government, leaked by the 
website WikiLeaks, which take note of widespread corruption and the difficulties of 
completing business transactions in these countries.
49
  The corruption of government 
officials had been a concern of Arab publics across the region.  In 2008, WikiLeaks 
confirmed what many Tunisians already knew: that Ben Ali’s regime had become, in 
essence, a kleptocracy,
50
 and that these policies were stifling investment and job creation 
within the government.
51
  The Gini coefficient, which measures the income inequality 
                                                 
45
 Goldstone 2011  
 
46
 Noueihed and Warren 2012, 38 
 
47
 Khouri 2012, 8 
 
48
 Transparency International 2010 
 
49
 Benchemsi 2012b, 66; Lynch 2012, 73 
 
50
 Lynch 2012, 73 
 
51
 Goldstone 2011 
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within a country by comparing the shares of the country’s income held by each quintile 
of the country’s population, was relatively similar for Jordan and Tunisia, with Egypt 
only being a slight outlier.  
Another broad trend that many accounts have seen as feeding into the Arab 
Spring was economic liberalization.  A tenet of economic liberalization policies was an 
emphasis on reducing government spending.  In Arab states not blessed with large oil 
incomes, this meant cutting funding for social safety net programs, such as Tunisia’s 
National Employment Fund, which trained workers and created jobs, and an Egyptian 
policy that guaranteed jobs for college graduates.
52
  While these reforms allowed more 
foreign investment to flow into the countries because they were seen as being committed 
to Washington Consensus-style economic liberalization policies, the benefits of this 
growth mostly flowed to the upper classes and exacerbated inequalities between the 
haves and have-nots.
53
  Despite the unequal rise in income, economic liberalization also 
brought with it technologies that citizens across the region began to adopt.  These three 
countries had high rates of cell phone usage, and internet usage grew quickly in the years 
preceding the Arab Spring, particularly among the young, the well-educated, and the 
urban populations. 
This section has reviewed literature and statistics to show that, while there was 
some variation on the indicators used above – opportunities for youth, economic 
performance, and development – the differences in outcomes in Egypt, Jordan, and 
Tunisia suggest that the shared structural conditions probably do not strongly explain 
what happened, as the leaders had a similar group of problems against which they were 
                                                 
52
 Goldstone 2011 
 
53
 Game 2011 
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working.  Unemployment (particularly for youth and the well-educated), economic 
inequality, a highly controlled press, and the limitation of democratic rights were 
prevalent across the countries in the region.  In order to find the reason for the differences 
in outcome, that is, why some of the region’s leaders lost power while the king of 
Morocco maintained his throne, I will focus primarily on differences in the regime 
structure and the regime’s actions to determine why the king of Morocco was able to hold 
onto his power when other leaders in the region were not. 
b. Regime Features 
The literature reviewed in this section will suggest that regime features explain 
how a country is able to withstand protests.  Among these regime features are the 
presence or lack of international support for the regime, some state control over key parts 
of the economy, whether or not the army is well-funded and professionalized (as in, 
whether it sees itself as having separate interests from the ruler), a revolutionary tradition 
or strong ideology (in some cases, this is manifested as a religious ideology in support of 
the king), and having some degree of openness in the political system for complaints to 
be dealt with first by societal actors before bubbling up to crisis levels. 
A factor that has been seen as supporting the resilience of authoritarian political 
systems is their connection to other powerful regional or international actors, such as 
Saudi Arabia.  While the Saudi Arabian ruling family has an interest in seeing 
monarchies be able to withstand the popular protests, particularly the Sunni king of Shia-
majority Bahrain, this interest did not seem to extend much beyond the Gulf 
monarchies.
54
  A lack of international intervention on behalf of the government, or at 
                                                 
54
 Kühnhardt 2012 
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least a less-strong defense of the government, is important for the success of the 
protestors.
55
 
The relative strength of the autocrat vis-à-vis those challenging him, particularly 
along three structural pillars of strength, determines whether the incumbent will be able 
to maintain power when tested, Lucan Way claims in Resistance to Contagion: Sources 
of Authoritarian Stability in the Former Soviet Union.  These pillars of strength can 
include 1) a highly institutionalized ruling party backed by a “non-material source of 
cohesion” such as a revolutionary tradition or a strong ideology; 2) an extensive, and 
well-funded, coercive apparatus; and 3) state control over the economy, either from 
reliance on “easily captured energy revenues”, or a lack of privatization of key sectors of 
the economy.
56
  Echoing Way’s second pillar, Steven Heydeman writes, in Social Pacts 
and Authoritarianism, that the capacity for autocrats to stay in power comes from the 
creation and consolidation of a “national-populist social pact,” which includes not only 
formal institutions such as forms of governance and channels of resource allocation but 
also informal institutions as well.
57
  The inclusion of informal institutions gives the 
autocrat a degree of “bounded adaptiveness” – when a problem cannot be solved within 
the existing formal political sphere, the parties involved can use informal institutions to 
solve the issue without challenging the political status quo too much.
58
   
The strength and institutionalization of the coercive apparatus, Eva Bellin argues 
in Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from 
                                                 
55
 Goldstone 2011, 1 
 
56
 Way 2010, 230 
 
57
 Heydemann 2007, 22 
 
58
 Heydemann 2007, 26-7 
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the Arab Spring, was one of the most important factors in determining whether a regime 
fell during the Arab Spring protests.
59
  When the members of the security apparatus are 
personally invested in the survival of the regime, they will be more likely to defend their 
leader against popular protests.
60
  Autocrats also appoint close associates or members of 
their families to ensure that enough discipline is maintained that, if protests do erupt, the 
security forces will not back them against the regime.
61
  For this reason, James Quinlivan, 
author of Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East, claims that 
authoritarian leaders hold much higher loyalty standards for leaders of the security forces 
than they do for similarly-ranked positions elsewhere in the government.
62
 
Bellin also contends that in Morocco, the higher ranks within the security forces 
and the army are filled with relatives and allies of the king – a move that not only 
attempts to prevent military rebellion, but also gives members of these institutions 
stronger incentives to back the king or the government against the demands of the 
protestors, as she writes in The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective.
63
  Morocco is not unique in the region for 
adopting this policy; both Saudi Arabia and Iraq under Saddam Hussein use or used 
similar tactics to ensure the loyalty of their security forces.
64
  In the Tunisian case, on the 
other hand, President Ben Ali and his predecessor Habib Bourguiba deliberately kept 
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their military small and underequipped, out of fear that a “politically indispensable 
military might turn against them.”65  
Bellin further suggests that the most important factor in whether a regime fell 
because of the Arab Spring protests is the degree to which the coercive apparatus was 
willing to suppress the protestors.
66
  Similar to the situations seen during the Color 
Revolution in Eastern Europe,
67
 when the military is highly institutionalized – and when 
its members have little stake in the survival of the regime for their continued employment 
– it is more likely to stand behind the protestors,68 or at least it will be “more willing… to 
disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed.”69  Despite the fact that 
“everyday repression” in Middle Eastern autocracies is carried out by the police or 
security agencies, these actors often do not have enough manpower or resources to end 
mass uprisings the scale of which was seen during the Arab Spring; therefore, the army 
can become the ruler’s “repressive agent of last resort,” Milan Svolik argues in The 
Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
70
  However, that dynamic does not always occur: in the 
Tunisian case, the army was willing to stand between the protestors and the (much less 
institutionalized) police force.
71
  In both Egypt and Tunisia, however, there was a belief 
among officers that they would be able to play more of a role under a new regime, which 
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helped provide another incentive for them to back the protestors, particularly after it was 
clear that the protests were growing and claimed backing from many facets of society.
72
   
Another set of arguments concern the relative advantages that are present in 
monarchies.  David Brumberg, author of The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy, 
acknowledges the king’s position as allowing him to have “more institutional and 
symbolic room to improvise reforms than do Arab presidents,” which can buy the 
monarch more time just on the promise of reform.
73
  In Political Authority in Crisis: 
Mohammed VI’s Morocco, Moroccan political scientist Abdelslam Maghraoui notes that 
the region’s kings are able to use three “sacred institutions” – Islam, the nation, and the 
monarchy – as fallback points when the debates about corruption or changing certain 
laws become too sensitive. Protecting "sacred institutions" has become an excuse for 
avoiding sensitive debates and for insulating influential officials, private interests and 
powerful institutions from criticism.”74 
There are also elements particular to the Moroccan monarchy that made the 
likelihood of protestors demanding the overthrow of the king less likely.  Boukhars 
shows how the king’s positions as Commander of the Faithful and as a descendent of the 
Prophet Mohammed, alongside his duties as the ruling monarch of the country, combine 
the sacred and the profane in such a way as to require the opposition to frame their 
objections in specific ways, so as not to fall into sacrilege.
75
  In Jordan, where the 
Hashemite dynasty has a similar familial connection to the Prophet, protestors against 
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King Abdullah II have employed similar tactics.  Abdelbaki Hermassi takes this belief 
another step further to note that the military finds it difficult object to a king’s authority 
when he is acting as the country’s religious leader, a dynamic that can be seen in many 
Middle Eastern monarchies, as he writes in Socioeconomic Change and Political 
Implications: The Maghreb.
76
  In January 2011, the Tunisian military, on the other hand, 
chose to side with the protestors and to protect them from the abuses from other 
organizations within the security apparatus, in part because the professionalized Tunisian 
military owed little political and no religious allegiance to President Ben Ali.
77
 
In general, kings may also better resist charges of corruption than presidents may 
be able to.  Before the Arab Spring protests, accusations of government corruption and 
clientelism were widespread in both Tunisia and Morocco.  Marc Lynch writes in The 
Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East that “the regime of 
President Ben Ali had degenerated into a typical, if extreme, family kleptocracy.”78  
While similar types of corruption were occurring in Morocco as well, “protestors focused 
tightly on calls for democracy, accountability, and the rule of law, and carefully avoided 
direct challenges to the king,” in part because of the belief that the changes that needed to 
be made could not occur without the consent of the king.
 79
  Roger Owen, author of The 
Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life, believes that Arab monarchs are better 
protected from accusations of corruption because they have maintained the traditional 
loyalties that come from being a member of a dynasty; these traditions can result in a 
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belief that some of the king’s fortunes and connections were inherited, not merely due to 
scheming and corruption.
80
   
Kings are given a set of tools to which they can refer to keep the people on their 
side.  Jack Goldstone writes in Understanding the Revolutions of 2011 that one method 
that monarchs used during the Arab Spring to stay in power was to make direct appeals to 
nationalism and royal tradition as reasons for the king to retain his crown.
81
  These 
appeals, argues Owen Kirby in Want Democracy? Get a King, are based on traditional 
values, such as religious and cultural identities, that members of the society have agreed 
are beneficial; this is a perk, he believes, that republican leaders in the Middle East 
cannot draw upon because they do not have generations of tradition to support them.
82
  
Having a regime in which some degree of openness in the political system is 
allowed can also help an autocrat to maintain power.  Daniel Brumberg argues in The 
Trap of Liberalized Autocracy that three factors resulting from some degree of openness 
have sustained autocracies: 1) not being tied down to a particular ideology creates 
distance between the state and society leaves room for dissonant politics, which helps to 
“short-circuit the growth of counterhegemonic… movements;” 2) being non-hegemonic, 
which allows for some diversity of views to compete for the attention of members of the 
public; and 3) being economically developed enough to be free from exclusively 
concerning itself with the fate of one industry or resource.
83
  Authoritarian leaders allow 
this space within the public sphere because, while organizations are able to address the 
                                                 
80
 Owen 2012, 126 
 
81
 Goldstone 2011, 1 
 
82
 Kirby 2000, 10 
 
83
 Brumberg 2002, 61 
 
 22 
 
social concerns of the people, the regime holds the ultimate control over the public sphere 
and can take power away from these groups if their complaints become too noisy or they 
demand too much.
84
 
Autocrats can use their centrality in the political system to bring into power 
groups that support their agenda, while at the same time, excluding those that do not.  
The creation of an in-group/out-group dynamic allows the king to keep the loyalty of the 
groups that have been allowed into Parliament; during times of economic crises, Ellen 
Lust-Okar argues earlier in Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of 
Political Opposition, the leaders “creates incentives for loyalists to refrain from 
promoting a conflict that excluded opponents could exploit.”85  These incentives keep the 
‘friendly’ opposition from attempting to mobilize the masses against their ruler or his 
government, even if their demands have not been met, out of fear that their movement 
may be hijacked by the more radical elements within society.
86
 
Because of the king’s activity in the political sphere, by managing which groups 
are allowed into power in Parliament, he has been able to manufacture a “politics of 
consensus” that makes challenging his authority more difficult. 87  Though this model of 
consensual politics requires time-to-time modifications, it should be considered a feature 
of the regime because previous kings took the underlying actions and its basic form 
greatly informs modern political activities.  Ahmed Benchemsi argues in Morocco: 
Outfoxing the Opposition, that this system set itself up for divide-and-rule tactics that 
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keep the king in the center of the country’s political sphere.88  Other authors agree with 
Benchemsi, stating that kings, in fact, encourage a certain amount of pluralism because 
the king is able to serve as the “linchpin of the political system” 89 and that he is able to 
“balance, manipulate, and control societies characterized by… vertical cleavages.”90  
Another factor is that the king is the head of the country constitutionally, religiously, and 
symbolically – the king is able to manipulate not only the political realm, but also 
religious doctrine to make challenges to his authority less legitimate in the eyes of many 
of his subjects. 
To summarize, the literature discussed above suggests that whether regimes were 
overthrown (or not) during the Arab Spring, protests are due to regime features.  These 
regime features include whether or not the army is professionalized (and therefore 
whether it sees itself as being separate from the ruler) and well-funded, the presence or 
lack of international support for the regime, a revolutionary tradition or strong ideology, 
some state control over key parts of the economy, and having some openness in the 
political system.  At first glance, these explanations seem to be more promising to 
account for the Moroccan regime’s durability than the structural conditions, since its 
regime differs from its neighbors in these matters.  Thus, a survey of the authoritarian 
literature suggests that an initial, top-down focus makes sense, and indicates that focus 
should be placed on the variables of the regime’s relationship with its security sector and 
the religious support for the king’s ability to rule. 
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c. Regime Strategies and Actions 
There are strategic variables that explain why authoritarian leaders stay in power, 
despite rebellions and protests.  While regime features include those attributes of the 
government and society that existed prior to the Arab Spring protests, strategic choices 
that leaders made in response to the protests within their countries.  These choices can 
include choosing to isolate the country from outside influences; marginalizing the 
opposition; “buying off” members of the opposition, perhaps by giving them part of what 
they want; repressing or dividing the opposition so it cannot work as effectively; or 
persuading the people of the country either that the opposition is somehow “wrong” or 
that the government is “right.”  In this literature, there is not much difference in the 
actions that can be taken by kings or by presidents; in fact, all authoritarian leaders can 
learn which strategies are best to be used from each other, whether they consciously 
decide to model this behavior or not. 
When they face challenges to their regimes, authoritarian leaders can utilize a 
variety of strategies or policies to ensure that they remain in power – choices which can 
be labeled as “pre-emptive authoritarianism.”91  These strategies fall under three broad 
categories, as defined by Vitali Silitski, author of Contagion Deterred: Preemptive 
Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the Case of Belarus): these include 1) 
tactical pre-emption, or attacks on the opposition and its infrastructure; 2) institutional 
pre-emption, which changes the rules of the political game to make it more difficult for 
members of the opposition to gain access to the halls of power; and 3) cultural pre-
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emption, which includes using policies and propaganda to install fear of regime change or 
democracy into the minds of the public.
92
   
Under the first strategy, tactical pre-emption, the regime could make decisions to 
repress the opposition, either by making their organizations illegal or imprisoning their 
leaders.
93
  They can also choose to distribute goods in such a way that it “buys off” parts 
of the opposition, a strategy that may work best when the opposition is comprised of a 
coalition of groups with disparate demands.
94
  This strategy is also a useful way for 
leaders to make sure that parts of their own coalition do not defect to join the opposition.  
In Management of Opposition in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, Ellen Lust-Okar writes 
that incumbents can use one of two strategies, depending upon the structure of 
contestation, to balance the strength of opposition against the regime.  The first strategy, 
fragmenting political groups in order to create two or more opposing, but moderate, 
political demands, tends to be used by regimes that have unified structures of 
contestation,
95
 that is when members of the opposition are included or excluded in a 
uniform fashion.
96
  The second strategy, available to rulers who have divided structures 
of opposition (which includes some groups of the opposition in the parliament or public 
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sphere but excludes others),
97
 involves strengthening “ideologically radical political 
opponents to create a threat to the moderates.”98 
The second category of pre-emptive actions a regime can take, institutional pre-
emption, can involve such policies as marginalizing the opposition by changing the 
electoral rules.
99
  Examples of these policies are changing the date of the election so that 
the opposition does not have enough time to effectively campaign, or giving government-
backed groups more time or resources to campaign than is granted to opposition groups.  
Particularly in states where the media is controlled by the government, the regime can 
also shut out opposition members from having any (positive) coverage on the television 
or radio.
100
 
The final category of actions is cultural pre-emption, in which the government 
attempts to either block the idea of democracy or reform from reaching its citizens or, 
once those ideas become public, attempt to block their spread or support the idea that 
democracy is somehow ‘dangerous’ or ‘foreign.’101  The regime could take actions such 
as isolating the country from perceived external threats, examples of which are foreign 
media or NGOs or so-called subversive websites, or persuading its citizens that the 
opposition is somehow ‘wrong’ or that the government is ‘right’ on these issues.102  
These tactics show that authoritarian leaders not only take reactive steps in an attempt to 
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change the behavior of those who are involved in protesting the regime, but that they also 
make proactive choices to change the beliefs of the general public.
103
 
Having an opposing view available in the public sphere, paradoxically, has helped 
authoritarian leaders to maintain their power; therefore, some of these rulers explicitly 
pursue policies that create or exploit divisions between societal groups or political 
parties.
 104
  They have explicitly pursued policies that bring opposing views into the 
government to counter the power of the governing coalition.  Driss Maghraoui, author of 
Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern Politics, argues 
that rulers have “made use of this political pluralism as a tool to divide and fragment the 
political parties in order for the monarch to act as the main arbitrator of the political 
scene.”105  Since the ruler injects himself into the political sphere so frequently, a palace-
dominated “politics of consensus” has emerged.106  Since the autocrat and his entourage 
are so dominant in the government, often times the political parties fail to offer 
alternative visions of their country’s future to counter the consensus.107  Sean Yom, in 
Understanding the Resilience of Monarchy during the Arab Spring, credits statecraft, or 
the monarch’s constitutional ability to stay above the political fray and act as a caretaker, 
for the monarch’s ability to withstand the protests during this period.108  The king may be 
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seen as an (relatively) impartial arbitrator between groups that, if the reforms go too far, 
may actually end up out of power.   
Another strategy that authoritarian rulers can use to keep themselves in power, 
once protests have started, is to grant some democratic/liberalizing concessions, or at 
least the appearance of some concessions, to the protestors, often called “democratic 
decorations.”109  Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski argue in Authoritarian 
Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats that one of the tactics autocrats use is the 
investing of more authority in pseudo-democratic institutions.
110
  These institutions, in 
particular partisan legislatures, “incorporate potential opposition forces, investing them 
with a stake in the ruler’s survival.”111  Unlike in some European countries, however, the 
investiture of power into these institutions did not lead to the permanent relinquishing of 
power, Gandhi argues in Political Institutions under Dictatorship, because Middle 
Eastern monarchs (in particular) had the brute strength to ensure that this would not 
happen.
112
  Rather, legislatures serve as a “controlled institutionalized channel through 
which outside groups can make their demands and incumbents can make concessions 
without appearing to cave to popular protest.”113  Opening up the political field can also 
give the autocrat the ability to select his partners from a more diverse set of options.  This 
choice can help to recalibrate the balance of power in response to changes in 
demographics or power within the society, Russell E. Lucas states in Monarchical 
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Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime 
Type.
114
 
The authors above write that the autocrat’s choices determine if he will stay in 
power once protests against him start.  These choices can include choosing to isolate the 
country from outside influences; marginalizing the opposition; buying off parts of the 
opposition, perhaps by giving them part of what they want; repressing or dividing the 
opposition so it cannot work as effectively; or persuading the people of the country that 
the opposition will lead the country down the wrong track.  Indeed, during the 2011 
protests, King Mohammed VI used many of these tactics to end the protests without 
having to give up his power, including pursuing policies to divide the opposition, buying 
off segments of society both monetarily and by giving the protestors some of what they 
were demanding (at least on paper). 
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CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS 
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to answer two questions.  1) How, if at all, did Morocco differ 
from other regional countries in terms of economic or political variables that could 
explain why there were popular demonstrations in 2010-2011?  2) Were these differences 
substantial enough to explain why the protests led to the overthrow of some leaders, but 
not of King Mohammed VI of Morocco? 
Across the Arab world, many similar conditions were present that could help to 
explain the outbreak of the Arab Spring protests.  Among these conditions were a “youth 
bulge,” or a larger-than-normal cohort of young people, which created an unmet need for 
more economic opportunities; government policies that failed to protect citizens from the 
effects of economic downturns; and an economic system that benefited those in power, 
not the average citizen.  However, while these conditions can help tell the story of why 
the protests erupted, they do less to explain why some leaders fell while others stood 
firm.  In Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia – countries which tend to fall in the middle 
of the Arab countries in terms of economic development – the indicators are not so 
different as to offer a compelling explanation why the king of Jordan and Morocco 
maintained their power while the presidents of Egypt and Tunisia lost power. 
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2.  The “Youth Bulge” 
Across the Middle East and North Africa ahead of the Arab Spring protests, states 
were dealing with the effects of large youth cohorts.  In Morocco, the average age of the 
population was 26 years old, as noted in Table 3.1 below.
115
  The youth population of 
Morocco was also quickly growing – over the course of one generation, from 1980 to 
2010, this population grew from just over 4 million in 1980 to approximately 6.3 million 
in 2010, a 55 percent increase in 30 years.
116
 
Table 3.1 – Youth Statistics in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia 
 Morocco Egypt Jordan Tunisia 
Median Age 
a
 26 24 21 29 
% of Population under 24 
b
 47 53 53 40 
% of Unemployed Young Men 
c
 23 17 23 31 
% of Unemployed Young Women 
d
 19 48 46 29 
Data is from 2010 
a
 Youth Unemployment in MENA, 5 
b
 Mirkin 2010, 32 
 
c
 Youth Unemployment in MENA, 11 
d
 Youth Unemployment in MENA, 11 
 
The fact that the population was so young created a set of specific challenges, 
including the need to create ever more jobs to keep up with the growing population, 
which governments in the region were unable to meet.
117
  Youth aged 15-24 constituted 
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35.7 percent of all unemployed workers, despite only making up 25.1 percent of the 
potential labor force.
118
  A 2003 report noted that it would take years of substantial 
growth for the Moroccan economy to develop enough that the annual increase in 
population would not “place a burden on social services, the housing market, and 
ultimately, the labor market.”119  This problem, moreover, was not new; as early as the 
mid-1980s, government agencies were noting that the Moroccan economy was not 
producing enough jobs to employ its growing population.
120
 
Having a degree, however, did not offer a guarantee of employment; in fact, while 
the unemployment rate for workers in Morocco who had not completed any formal 
education was 7.7 percent, the rate jumped to 61.2 percent for those workers with a high 
school diploma or higher.
121
  Because of the lack of employment opportunities, 
particularly for recent university graduates, 70 percent of Arab youth “want[ed] to 
migrate out of the region,” an Arab League official noted at a 2011 conference on 
population policy.
122
  This is in addition to over 4 percent of the Moroccan population 
that had already moved abroad to search for economic opportunities in Europe and the 
Gulf states.
123
 
For those young Moroccans who had found a job, the quality of the work was 
often poor.  A World Bank report notes that 88 percent of employed youth work in the 
                                                 
118
 Boudarbat and Ajbilou 2007, 6 
 
119
 Rivlin 2007, 197 
 
120
 Sabagh 1993, 31 
 
121
 Boudarbat and Ajbilou 2007, 7 
 
122
 Hoffman and Jamal 2012, 170 
 
123
 Rivlin 2007, 205 
 
 33 
 
informal economy, without the job security or benefits that having a contract can bring.
124
   
Part of the problem is an educational system that has not kept up with changes in 
technology and the economy: education systems have been “primarily geared toward 
preparing students to serve in the public sector, which used to be – but no longer is – the 
primary employer of new graduates.”125  While there is high demand for vocational 
training, these programs often have limited coverage, particularly in the rural areas of the 
country, are understaffed, and do not offer enough training in new skills such as internet 
technologies.
126
 
Having a large, youthful population can be a benefit to economic development if 
the government can tap into it.  However, these demographic trends can cause challenges 
and instability if the governments fail to create policies that give economic and 
educational opportunities to youth in particular.
127
  While an argument can be made that 
having such a large population of youth, particularly of unemployed youth, can lead to 
protests, there is no clear connection between these demographic challenges and the 
overthrow of the regime’s leader.  In Jordan, for example, the population is younger and 
less employed than in Morocco, yet King Abdullah was also able to keep his throne.
128
  
Therefore, the presence of a youthful, yet unemployed population, cannot fully explain 
why King Mohammed VI of Morocco maintained his position of power while other 
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regional leaders, who faced similar demographic challenges, were made to leave their 
offices. 
3. Economics and Development 
The February 20 Movement tapped into sources of popular anger about the state 
of the economy when its members called for the end of corruption and the reform of an 
economic system that benefitted only those who were well connected.
129
  Similarly, in 
Tunisia, protestors initially took up Mohammed Bouazizi’s cause, calling for a fair and 
equal system in which earn a living.
130
  The economic liberalization policies adopted in 
the 1990s after pressure from international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund did not necessarily increase the well-being of the average 
Moroccan citizen; conversely, these policies may have made people more insecure, as the 
government cut social services in favor of balancing its budget.
131
 
Table 3.2 takes note of indicators about economic inequality and corruption.  The 
Gini Coefficient measures the percent of a country’s income that is held by each segment 
of the population and then aggregates these percentages into an indicator on which the 
most income-equal societies have the lowest scores.  In 2007, Morocco’s coefficient was 
40.9, and had been on the rise over the previous decade.
132
  Using Transparency 
International’s 1-10 scale on the prevalence of corruption, with 10 being the least corrupt, 
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Morocco falls around the halfway point of the scale, ranking 85
th
 out of 178 countries 
with a score of 3.4.
133
   
Table 3.2 – Economic and Development Indicators in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and 
Tunisia  
 Morocco Egypt Jordan Tunisia 
- GDP per Capita a $2,975 $2,698 $4,666 $4,194 
- Gini Coefficient b 
(0= most equal) 40.9 (2007) 34.4 (2001) 39.7 (2007) 40.0 (2005) 
- Transparency Intl c 
(10 = most clean) 3.4 3.1 4.7 4.3 
Data is from 2010, unless otherwise noted. 
a
 World Bank 2013a  
b
 Central Intelligence Agency 2012  
c
 Transparency International 2010 
 
Economic development and liberalization policies adopted in Morocco, as well as 
in other regional countries did little to minimize the vulnerability the average citizen felt 
about joblessness or poverty.
134
  During 2007-8 in Morocco, for example, approximately 
one out of every seven individuals lived on an income that was less than the equivalent of 
US $2 per day.
135
  The official national poverty rate was 9.0 percent in 2008,
136
 however, 
NGOs contest that figure as being manipulated for political reasons – a World Bank study 
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reports that 49 percent of Moroccan young people – who make up 30 percent of the 
population – are not working or in school, a figure that the World Bank believes points to 
a much higher unemployment rate.
137
  During the second half of 2010, there was a 
worldwide spike in food and energy prices that made living at, or below, the poverty 
level that much more difficult.  According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization, for instance, from July 2010 to the end of the year, the price of wheat went 
up by 84 percent while cooking oils and fats increased by 57 percent.
138
  Overall, food 
prices increased by 32 percent in 2010 alone.
139
  The threat of protest appeared to make 
the government take notice of these increases in prices, because on February 15, 2011, 
the king doubled subsidies on cooking oil, flour and sugar.
140
 
Another impact of the so-called “Great Recession” was a decrease in the amount 
of money coming into North African states from their citizens living abroad.  Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Egypt have among the highest inflows of per capita remittances in the world.  
Ahead of the economic downturn, each Moroccan emigrant sent an average of $100 back 
to his home country per month, accounting for 8 percent of GDP.
141
  The downturn in the 
global economy in 2008 caused decreases in the amount of remittances sent by 
expatriates to their home countries by a measure of 10.3 percent in Egypt and 17.0 
percent in Morocco.
142
  While not a result of any actions taken by the Moroccan 
                                                 
137
 McManus 2012  
 
138
 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2011 
 
139
 Goldstone 2011 
 
140
 Lalami 2011b  
 
141
 Achy 2010, 9 
 
142
 International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 2010, 4 
 37 
 
government, this decline in remittances affected many families’ economic bottom line in 
negative ways, and contributed to the sense that, overall, the economy was worsening for 
the average Moroccan family. 
The “Great Recession” of 2008 did not create Morocco’s economic problems.  
Rather, there are systemic problems within the economy that have been present for 
decades, the first of which is the country’s heavy reliance on agriculture.  During the 
1980s and 1990s, the concentration of investments in export-oriented farming at the cost 
of developing more tradition forms of agriculture, which employs 90 percent of 
Moroccan peasants, “led to a massive exodus from rural areas, a dramatic expansion of 
urban shantytowns, and an increasing dependence on imported grain.”143  Despite growth 
in other sectors of the economy, reliance on agriculture (and its highly variable amounts 
of production due to rainfall totals) meant large changes in the amount of year-to-year 
GDP growth; for instance, the Morocco’s GDP grew by 12.2 percent in 1996, but 
because of drought conditions, the economy contracted by 2.2 percent during the next 
year.
144
  This swing meant that more food had to be imported,
145
 and an increase in the 
number of people living in poverty; scholars attribute 84 percent of the increase in 
poverty during the 1990s to a slowdown in the economy.
146
 
In addition to the inability to keep up with population growth and a heavy reliance 
on good weather for agriculture to buoy economic growth, scholars note that 
mismanagement of the economic liberalization process has also had a negative impact on 
                                                 
143
 A. Maghroui 2001a, 77 
 
144
 Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine 2007, 200 
 
145
 Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine 2007, 202 
 
146
 Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine 2007, 203 
 
 38 
 
growth.
147
  Researchers take note of local councils that had been given the legal 
competency to decide on land use and economic development policies; however, many of 
these councils were not granted the authority to tax.  This set up a system in which the 
councils must ask for revenue from state or national officials to implement the 
development policies they had been given competency to create.
148
  When these local 
councils had been given funds, mechanisms of transparency and accountability had not 
been put into place to ensure that the money is not mismanaged.
149
 
Perceptions of corruption and economic inequality also made their way onto the 
protestors’ signs.  Members of the February 20 movement called for the firing of corrupt 
officials and “sunshine” policies that would make corruption much less easy to get away 
with.
150
  Policies such as the ones proposed by the protestors meshed with the regime’s 
unfulfilled promises.  Ottaway and Riley note in Morocco: Top-Down Reform without 
Democratic Transition that, despite the Moroccan regime’s rhetoric about investigating 
and ending corruption, the actual policies have not gone far, in part because the 
investigation would implicate members of the makhzen, the palace establishment.
151
  In 
particular, senior members of the armed forces and the security agencies “continue to use 
their political connections to deny others the chance to compete with them on a level 
playing field,” and are often “not held accountable for engaging in corrupt behavior.”152  
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A 2010 US embassy cable, leaked by the site WikiLeaks, alleges that “the major 
institutions and processes of the Moroccan state are being used by the Palace to coerce 
and solicit bribes in the country’s real estate sector…;” the cable goes on to say that 
“while corrupt practices existed during the reign of King Hassan II… they have become 
much more institutionalized with King Mohammed VI.”153 
Other scholars have taken notice of this trend as well, stating that “rather than 
labor, personal capability or merit, it is the personal contact to political decision makers 
able to allocate resources (and thus build clientele networks) which secures social status 
and material well-being for the individual.”154  The World Bank has insisted that “over-
centralized… stagnant, and corrupt” official bureaucracies need to be reformed, because 
they “hamper national development.”155  In a survey conducted by the same organization, 
Moroccan business leaders claimed that the “behavior of the administration” was the 
most significant constraint on private-sector development within the country.
156
  
Corruption was a way of life for individuals as well; a 2008 Transparency International 
field study found that 60 percent of Moroccan families had been compelled to give bribes 
in order to go about their day-to-day lives.
157
  While Global Integrity, an anti-corruption 
monitoring organization, gives Morocco the highest marks for its anti-corruption laws, it 
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gives the country a dismal score (9 out of a possible 100) on the application of these laws 
when it comes to combating corruption within the executive branch of government.
158
   
In particular, Global Integrity notes that the executive leadership – meaning the 
king and members of his inner circle – cannot be held accountable for their actions 
through criminal proceedings; these individuals also are not required to disclose their 
financial information, personally or for the offices they run.
159
  In 2007, for instance, 
Forbes magazine featured the king as one of the richest royals in the world, noting that 
the royal entourage has a $960,000 operating cost, which is spent “mostly on gasoline 
and clothes.”160  The royal investment firm, Société National d’investissement (SNI), 
which holds a near monopoly on some sectors of the economy, reported a 50 percent 
increase in profit in 2011, despite the economic downturn.
161
 
In addition to their frustrations about corruption, the protestors took notice of the 
increasing inequality between the haves and have-nots in Moroccan society; from 1999 to 
2007, Morocco’s Gini coefficient grew from 39.5 to 40.7.162  While this is not a large 
change overall, the numbers hide a distribution of wealth that increasingly favors those 
living in fast-growing urban areas such as Casablanca and Rabat, while disfavoring those 
who live in rural areas or less dynamic urban areas such as Fez.
163
  One obstacle to rural 
growth is the high rates of illiteracy among both the male and female populations – in 
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2008, 63 percent of the rural population over the age of 15 was unable to read and 
write.
164
  In particular, the lack of schools in rural villages and the cost of sending 
children to them make receiving an education difficult for rural families.
 165
   
Despite the “common thread” of economic problems across the region, these 
structural variables act as a necessary, but not sufficient, explanation as to why the 
protests broke out in 2011.
166
  Across the region, protestors called for the end of 
corruption, more jobs, and government policies to end the inflation of prices on 
necessities.  However, these variables have little explanatory weight when trying to 
decipher why the king of Morocco was able to keep his throne while the Tunisian and 
Egyptian presidents were forced from power. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to answer the two questions of: 1) How, if at all, did Morocco 
differ from other regional countries in terms of economic or political variables that could 
explain why there were popular demonstrations in 2010-11?  2) Were these differences 
substantial enough to explain why the protests led to the overthrow of some leaders, but 
not of King Mohammed VI of Morocco?  I argue that rulers across Northern Africa were 
dealing fairly similar structural conditions ahead of the outbreak of the protests; 
therefore, these differences are not significant enough to explain why the King of 
Morocco maintained his power while other regional leaders were forced to resign because 
of the protests.  
                                                 
164
 Achy 2010, 10 
 
165
 Achy 2010, 11 
 
166
Dalacoura 2011, 66-7 
 
 42 
 
Morocco shares with most of its neighbors the “indicators of poverty and social 
polarization, demographic hypertrophy of youth and blockage of its social mobility, the 
perception of pervasive corruption and disaffections with the political system,” Irene 
Fernández Molina writes in The Monarchy vs. the 20 February Movement: Who Holds 
the Reins of Political Change in Morocco.
167
  While there are some differences between 
countries where the regimes fell during the Arab Spring protests – Egypt and Tunisia – 
and regimes where the ruler kept his power despite the protests – Jordan and Morocco – 
these variations are not enough, in and of themselves, to explain why.  Morocco is similar 
to other regional countries in terms of youth demographics, particularly youth 
unemployment, having problems of unequal economic growth and corruption, and a 
disconnect between promises of action and actual solutions.  Having these dynamics 
might make protests more likely, and mean that the ruler will have to take action in some 
way to maintain his power, but they fail to account for differences in outcomes because 
of the protests.  
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CHAPTER IV 
REGIME STRATEGIES 
1.  Introduction  
This chapter will discuss whether the strategies used by King Mohammed VI of 
Morocco to diffuse the protests are different from the strategies used by other leaders in 
the region that ultimately lost their positions.  There are multiple avenues of policy 
choices available to presidents and kings alike – including isolating the country from 
outside influences, marginalizing the opposition, “buying off” members of the 
opposition, repressing or dividing the opposition, and persuading the country’s citizens 
that the actions proposed by the opposition will be detrimental to the country.
168
  These 
policy choices are divided into three main categories, which include 1) tactical pre-
emption, or attacks on the opposition and its infrastructure; 2) institutional pre-emption, 
which changes the rules of the political system to keep the opposition out of power; and 
3) cultural pre-emption, which includes using policies and propaganda to instill fear of 
democratization into the minds of the public, or to reinforce the popularity and legitimacy 
of the leader.
169
   
Any of these categories of choices weaken the opposition by drying up their 
sources of support within the society, by causing internal divisions within the movement, 
or by making it seem less likely that the opposition will achieve its goals.  Some scholars 
note that the use of these tactics – which Sean Yom labels as “statecraft” – is the reason 
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why kings maintained their power during the Arab Spring protests.
170
  However, this 
chapter will seek to show that, while kings may have pursued certain strategies, their use 
is not necessarily exclusive to monarchs. 
2. Tactical Preemption: Weakening and Dividing the Opposition 
Tactical preemption includes attacking the opposition and its infrastructure in 
such a way that it becomes more difficult for the opposition to operate effectively.
171
  In 
the Moroccan case, the king used pre-emptive measures to keep certain societal groups, 
such as public workers, or political parties from joining the protests with the members of 
the February 20 Movement.  After the constitutional amendment process was over, the 
king also used tactics to secure the votes of individual voters, to keep their vote on the 
‘yes’ side. 
In the weeks between the fall of Tunisian president Ben Ali in late January and 
the February 20 protests, hundreds of Moroccans rioted in the city of Tangier over the 
high unemployment rate and increases in the price of utilities.
172
  While these riots 
occurred before the February 20 protests, the planning for and execution of the two 
events were separate – the riots in Tangier were provoked when a French company was 
awarded a contract to provide the region’s utility services, a move that many local 
residents believed would result in higher utility prices.
173
   
In response to the protests in Tangier, the king of Morocco began to take actions 
that were designed to neutralize the citizens’ mobilization by offering a package of socio-
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economic measures: increased subsidies for food and fuel, the establishment of an 
unemployment subsidy program, and the expansion of free health care provision.
174
  This 
package also involved a large amount of spending aimed at workers: the minimum wage 
was raised by 15 percent, 3400 unemployed graduates were given civil service jobs, and 
public employees were granted the highest raise in Moroccan history – up to 35 percent 
in some sectors of the government.
175
  
The palace also used outright tactics to buy the support of individual voters or to 
scare them away from voting against the amendments.  During the Eid al-Adha holiday in 
November 2011, the government handed out sheep to supporters in rural areas.
176
  
Though reports of violence did not make it onto Western media outlets as they did in 
Egypt and Tunisia, Moroccan protestors also were harassed by the government and 
groups of “pro-monarchy thugs known as baltaja.”177  According to Human Rights 
Watch, nearly 100 people affiliated with the February 20 Movement were brought into 
police stations for questioning regarding their involvement with the protests.
178
 
The reforms announced by the king granted many of the demands being made by 
the protestors and human rights organizations, at least on paper.  However, these reforms 
also “bought off” other important groups in society, namely the political parties 
(including those that were based on Islamism).  By including the major political parties in 
the reform process, the king was able to keep them from joining with the protestors and 
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on board with constitutional amendments.  A constitutional reform process directed by 
the February 20 Movement would have had large consequences for the way in which 
power was distributed in the Moroccan government, moves that might have left the 
political parties without a seat at the table.  While the reforms offered by the king were 
incremental, and more on paper than in fact, they meant that politicians in Parliament 
would retain their power.  Strong ties between the makhzen and the main political parties 
made it unlikely that those parties would join in with the protestors, as doing so likely 
would have caused those parties to lose their place of privilege.
179
  Pseudo-democratic 
institutions, namely the legislature, invested political parties in the survival of the regime 
and the regime’s ruler.180  In exchange for being allowed into power, the political parties 
are asked not to demand much more of the ruler than he is willing to give.
181
   
3. Institutional Preemption: The Constitutional Amendment Process 
 One of the main tactics the king used to maintain his power despite the protest 
movement was the creation of a constitutional reform process that would address the 
demands of the people.  In this way, the challenges to the government were funneled into 
an institutionalized process.  Constitutional reforms, however, also gave the king the 
opportunity to change the rules of the political game in such a way that allowed himself 
and his allies to maintain their power. 
During late January and early February, as the protests were occurring, the king 
also decided to make some reforms in the human rights arena – reforms that had been 
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called for by some of the protestors.  In late February, the king created the National 
Human Rights Council (known by its French acronym, CNDH), and endowed it with a 
greater scope of action than any government-sponsored human rights organization had 
been granted in the past.
182
  Among the expanded powers granted to the CNDH were the 
ability to hear cases that had been brought to the Council by individuals and to 
investigate claims that been made during these hearings.
183
  At the same time, he also 
empowered the Court of Auditors and the Central Commission for the Prevention of 
Corruption to enforce fair competition, as well as transparency and accountability.
184
  It 
should be noted, however, that while power was given to these institutions, they remain 
accountable to the king alone, who can decide whether to implement their 
recommendations.
185
 
 On March 9, 2011, the king made a rare televised address to the people of 
Morocco, in which he announced that he would be creating a committee to explore 
possible constitutional reforms.
186
  While King Mohammed noted that he would likely 
give up some power, this concession was couched in terms of responding to “legitimate 
complaints,” which gave the king the ability to select which of the protestors’ demands 
he would actually support.
187
  Also of note was the fact that the king did not make any 
reference to the protestors when he made this announcement; the reforms were, at this 
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point, given a top-down character, in which the people respond to the king, not the other 
way around.
188
  The king’s announcement split the February 20 Movement from the vast 
majority of the population, many of whom were asking for practical, not radical, 
reforms.
189
  These ‘ordinary people’ “began praising the king for being a visionary who 
anticipated everything the youth wanted” – for keeping the political status quo while 
making the economic changes that needed to be made – while members of the February 
20 Movement “pointed out that the constitutional reform process was fundamentally 
undemocratic.”190  The protestors noted that the members of the constitutional 
commission were appointed by, and solely responsible to, the king, not the people of the 
country.
191
 
Despite the appearance (and existence) of a top-down character to the 
constitutional amendment process, the reforms broadly echoed the demands made on the 
protestors’ signs.192  The palace promised such things as ‘comprehensive constitutional 
change,’ featuring ‘the rule of law,’ an ‘independent judiciary,’ and an ‘elected 
government that reflects the will of the people, through the ballot box.’193  Specifically, 
the king would give up his power to appoint the prime minister and other cabinet 
members; rather, the king would be required to choose the head of the winning party to 
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be the prime minister, who would then form his government independently.
194
  A 
commission appointed by the king would work with the political parties, trade unions, 
and civil society groups to complete the additional constitutional reforms.
195
 
The rush to the vote was designed in such a way that the opposition had little time 
to organize against it or offer fully developed alternatives to the amendments.
196
  The 
regime and its allies dominated the period leading up to the vote: state-controlled 
television and radio stations “sang the new constitution’s praises” and the Friday before 
the vote, a Ministry of Islamic Affairs approved sermon was distributed to mosques 
across the country, in which imams would proclaim their support for the amendments 
from the pulpit.
197
  The palace also used companies and business groups to promote their 
agenda: companies placed banners around major cities and paid for television and radio 
ads to say that the management and employees of that establishment would be voting in 
favor of the constitutional amendments.
198
  This practice was used to a wide extent 
throughout the campaign: according to a report released by the Haute Autorité de la 
Communication Audiovisuelle, the ‘yes’ campaign received as much as 89.6 percent of 
the total airtime devoted to the constitutional amendment process.
199
  Those who publicly 
campaigned for a ‘no’ vote faced penalties – when Jalal Makhifi, the Morocco 
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correspondent for Dubai TV, mentioned the ‘no’ campaign in his reporting, associates of 
the king had Makhifi and his editor fired.
200
 
4. Cultural Preemption: The King as a Source of Stability vs. February 20 
Movement as a Source of Chaos 
 The king also used cultural tactics in an attempt to maintain his throne once the 
protests had started.  The king used his office to promote himself as the country’s source 
of stability against the chaotic demands of the February 20 Movement.  Because of this 
image as source of stability, the king received praise for keeping the calm and 
maintaining an orderly process. 
Despite the king’s announcement of a constitutional reform package, the February 
20 Movement-backed protests grew larger and reached more cities than ever.
201
  Violent 
clashes between regime-backed counterdemonstrators and members of the February 20 
Movement ensued when the counterdemonstrators showed up with stones and clubs.
202
  
In May, in order to pre-empt the “violence-mobilization cycle” that had been seen in 
Tunisia and Egypt – in which the protests would grow larger, more violent, and more 
demanding in response to police or government-backed brutality against the protestors – 
the king announced a snap referendum on the constitutional reforms that would be held 
on 1 July.
203
  Particularly after the April 29 terrorist bombing in Marrakesh, people were 
reminded of the threat of Islamist violence – one Morocco-watcher noted that the 
response to the attack reinforced a prevailing narrative about Morocco: “the king 
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represents stability, while the Islamists (and, by implication, those who associate with 
them) represent chaos.”204  
One of the differences between the Moroccan protests and those that occurred in 
other Arab states is the way in which the main groups of protestors have been framed by 
both the government and the media.  In the international media, Egyptian and Tunisian 
protestors were portrayed as “secular, tech-savvy leftists” while in Syria and Libya, the 
protestors were shown as “heroic freedom fighters.”205  However, protestors in the 
monarchies across the region were more or less painted as “anti-democratic 
fundamentalists.”206  Despite the fact that the February 20 Movement was, in fact, more 
in favor of democracy than the legal political parties, the palace was able to frame the 
protestors as being out of touch with the needs and desires of the average Moroccan 
citizen.  Among the key democratic demands made by the groups that comprised the 
February 20 Movement were the dissolution of the existing parliament; the release of 
political prisoners; the formation of an independent transitional government, leading to 
new elections; a new constitution that would limit the king’s power and assets; and 
judicial proceedings to investigate known cases of corruption and human rights 
violations.
207
 
Similar pro-monarchy rhetoric is found in Western media reports from the period 
around the beginning of the reform process, with scholars and journalists making  
statements such as “King Muhammad VI (sic) anticipated demonstrations by forming a 
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constitutional review committee to increase the powers of the Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers, in addition to other matters for the purpose of diminishing the 
present nature of the ‘absolute monarchy’ and moving towards a ‘constitutional 
monarchy.’”208  While the scenes from Tunisia and Egypt projected onto the American 
and European nightly news appeared violent, the Moroccan government was protected by 
the ‘relativity effect,’ in which the country’s comparatively mild management of the 
protests seemed to be “a model of reasonableness,” and drew praise from Western 
governments.
209
  Unlike in Egypt, where the response of the Mubarak regime was seen to 
be unnecessarily violent, the publics in the United States and Europe were generally in 
favor of the king and his reform package.
210
 
5. Conclusion 
Once protests erupted in early 2011, King Mohammed VI made strategic choices 
that increased the likelihood that he would stay in power. Among these choices were ones 
that kept the political parties from joining the opposition, ones that made it difficult for 
the February 20 Movement to attract followers, and ones that damaged the image of the 
Movement with the Moroccan people.  However, the tactics used by the palace are not 
only available to kings.  Both Presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali attempted, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to paint the protestors as promoting dangerous ideas or to change the 
political structure in such a way as to give the moderates within the protest movement 
part of what they wanted without having to give up their seats of power.  The difference 
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in outcomes, when it comes to regime strategies, seems to come more from what the 
protestors were demanding, rather than the fact that they were demanding it in the first 
place. 
 54 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
REGIME FEATURES 
1. Introduction 
 Three questions will be discussed in this chapter.  The first seeks to understand 
how political institutions and processes differed between Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt; 
did the degree of political openness in Morocco allow King Mohammed VI to maintain 
his throne despite the Arab Spring protests?  The second concerns the sources of 
legitimacy the leaders of these countries are able to draw upon and how these 
legitimacies impacted the leaders’ likelihood of retaining their power once the protests 
started.  Finally, I will examine whether being a monarchy offers the ruler a better chance 
of maintaining his position, and what could cause these better odds. 
 Morocco appears, on the surface, to mirror its North African neighbors by having 
formally democratic institutions that do not produce democratic outcomes.  The 
parliamentary opposition does not offer a distinct set of political options, resulting in a 
public that is apathetic about parliamentary politics.  The Islamist Party of Justice and 
Development (PJD), in particular, has pledged itself to the king’s agenda in order to be 
allowed into government at all.  Freedom House has noted the trend of increasing 
concentration of political power in the hands of the (already) powerful over the past few 
years.
 211 
  
 However, Morocco differs from its neighbors in terms of the basis of the ruler’s 
legitimacy.  King Mohammed VI has a legitimacy that comes from his dual positions as 
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the country’s political and religious leader.212  In addition to the legitimacy that comes 
from these positions, the king also has some additional legitimacy that comes from being 
a monarch, regardless of the king’s religious standing.213  During the Arab Spring 
protests, the king’s legitimacy allowed him to offer changes to the constitution that would 
not result in his loss of political power.  Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak, because they 
have only a secular authority, did not have this legitimacy to use to offer political 
reforms.  Furthermore, given that the king is the religious leader of his country, the king 
holds a special authority over the military that ties it to his person, unlike in Tunisia and 
Egypt, where the professionalized military backed the protestors over their president. 
2. Democratic Institutions and Practices in an Authoritarian Regime 
 Although the Constitution of Morocco creates democratic institutions, such as a 
bicameral Parliament and multi-party elections, the practice of democracy in Morocco is 
flawed.  In part, this is because of a mismatch between institutional design in the 
constitution and institutional practice in daily life.  However, Morocco’s political 
institutions are also heavily beholden to the king, a relationship that is codified, as well as 
merely being practiced.  The king’s position at the center of the Moroccan political 
sphere meant (and continues to mean) that any political changes that are necessary 
needed to be made through negotiations with the king or his close associates.  However, 
the fact that there is some more openness within the country’s democratic institutions 
than in the institutions of some of its neighbors, which appears to make the opposition 
more moderate. 
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According to Freedom House, Morocco was ranked at 4.5 on a scale of 2-7 (with 
7 being the least free), or ‘partially free,’ in 2010.214  Though it was ranked in the middle 
of the survey’s three categories, the country’s trend was marked as moving toward 
becoming ‘not free,’ and therefore more like its neighboring countries as noted in Table 
5.1 below, given that more political influence was being concentrated in the hands of 
those already in power.
215
  The media environment – a composite score of press freedoms 
in the legal, political and economic environments – in which an independent press could 
operate was ranked as ‘not free’, similar to other countries in the region in which the 
ability of journalists and citizens to criticize the government was curtailed, and official 
publications were edited by the heavy hand of the government.  Individuals felt the 
effects of these policies, as can be seen when protestors made complaints about the “role 
of regime-controlled media in circulating propaganda and stifling opposition voices.”216  
 
Table 5.1 – Democracy and Press Freedom Indicators in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan 
and Tunisia 
 Morocco Egypt Jordan Tunisia 
- Freedom House (2 = most free) 4.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 
- Freedom of the Press (0 = most free) 66 60 63 85 
Data is from Freedom House’s 2010 Freedom in the World report 
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Scholars write that the February 20 Movement showed the growing disparity 
between “the public’s dreams and aspirations for the establishment of a real democracy” 
and “the political parties and ruling elites’ politics of consensus” that gradual reforms 
were needed to maintain the country’s stability.217  This is similar to the Tunisian 
protestors’ unmet demands for reform during 2008 and other previous periods of 
protest.
218
  Protestors felt discouraged at the growing disconnect between having 
legislatures and political parties, while having little say in the political decisions being 
made.   
 The 1996 Moroccan Constitution – the version in use before the Arab Spring 
protests – declared Morocco to be a “constitutional monarchy” (Article 1) in which 
“sovereignty shall be that of the People” (Article 2) and “political parties, unions, district 
councils and trade chambers shall participate in the organization and representation of the 
citizens” (Article 3).219  At the same time, however, the king was granted special powers 
over the conduct of political life within the country.  For instance, the king was made 
“sacred and inviolable” (Article 23) and was given the power to appoint the Prime 
Minister (Article 24) and rule by royal decree on a wide range of issues (Article 29).
220
  
These issues included those that fell under the purview of the so-called ministries of 
sovereignty, which formally included the Ministries of Interior, Islamic Affairs, and 
Foreign Affairs.
221
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 The problem of Moroccan democracy, therefore, is not that elections and political 
parties are absent, but rather that they are ineffective in making real change because of 
their relative powerlessness vis-à-vis the king and the makhzen.
222
  Proof of this power 
imbalance can be found in the budgets of various government offices: the prime minister 
has to work with a budget that is roughly four percent of that of the royal court.
223
  
Because little real authority has been given to the parliament or other elected officials, the 
political parties, which could act as the people’s voice in government, are alienated from 
the people.
224
  Pro-democracy elites in Morocco note that the multiparty system is mostly 
used as a “mechanism to select, control, and reproduce a docile, corruptible, and 
dependent political elite,” not to promote actual democratic outcomes.225  
 Another problem with the democratic institutions established in Morocco is that 
the people do not trust these institutions, in part because the Constitution and practice 
have taken competency for some key issues from the Parliament and given them to the 
king.  In the last parliamentary elections before the Arab Spring protests, the turnout was 
a historic low, with only 37 percent of registered voters casting a ballot.
226
  The first 
parliamentary elections after the constitutional amendment process, held in November 
2011, yielded a 45 percent turnout of registered voters, though the number of 
registrations decreased by 2 million in between the two elections.
227
  Even the vote on the 
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constitutional amendments was met with low enthusiasm: the February 20 Movement and 
some Islamist groups boycotted the vote and the percentage of spoiled ballots was as high 
as one-third by some estimates.
228
 
 One reason that turnout is so low is that the political parties do not offer much in 
the way of ideological distinction.
229
  The opposition, at least those groups that are in 
Parliament, do not differentiate themselves much from the parties that have formed the 
government, and because of this, they have difficulty in “mobilizing mass 
constituencies.”230  Multi-party elections, it is believed, are mostly “a spectacle staged for 
the benefit of the Western media,” because they are “designed to make sure that the 
opposition wins enough seats to remain part of the system but never enough to really 
change or challenge it.”231  For instance, the Islamist Party of Justice and Development 
(PJD), the second-largest party in Parliament and the lead member of the parliamentary 
opposition, quickly acquiesced to the constitutional amendments put forth by the reform 
committee, in part because it has a desire to “continue and complete the process of 
integration of the Islamists in the legal political process.”232  In order to become more 
palatable to the regime, the PJD distanced itself from the extralegal Islamist opposition 
group al Adl wal Ihssan (Justice and Charity) to even be brought into the government, 
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and has accepted a very limited role, in which the party cannot propose legislation 
independently.
233
  
According to the pro-February 20 Movement website Mamfakinch (“we will not 
take it” in the Moroccan Arabic dialect), of the 34 political parties that operate legally in 
the country, 30 parties “abide by the Mazhken’s rules and do not challenge – or even dare 
to question – the king’s absolute supremacy.”234  Three of the four remaining parties – 
parties of the political left that call for full parliamentary monarchy in which running of 
the government would be completely in the hands of an elected parliament – ran as a 
block in the 2007 elections, yet they only managed to receive 1 percent of the seats
235
 (22 
of 325) in the Chamber of Representatives – the lower house of the Parliament that is 
directly elected.
236
  However, this result appears to be more attributable to infighting and 
ideological differences within the coalition than to any action taken by the king or 
members of his entourage.
237
 
 While the institutional set-up differs slightly in Morocco from those arrangements 
in Egypt or Tunisia, the fact remains that the dynamics of power between elected 
parliaments and the countries’ rulers led to situations where parliaments had power on 
paper only.  As such, these institutions did not work in a manner that seemed to be 
bringing any real change to the people they served.  Therefore, in many cases, the Arab 
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public saw street protests as the only legitimate way to voice their discontent in a system 
in which a single leader dominated politics.
238
 
In Morocco, several conditions at least appear to offer slightly more freedom.  
While it is debatable how real this freedom is, it is less debatable that the appearance of 
freedom convinced protestors to moderate their demands.  Unlike in Tunisia, for instance, 
where opposition parties were outlawed, alternations in power between coalitions was a 
common occurrence.
239
  In particular, Islamist opposition, in the form of the PJD, was 
allowed to participate in the government, whereas the main Tunisian Islamist group Al-
Nahdha was in exile and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was not allowed to contest 
elections.
240
  In addition to more political openness, reforms in the human rights realm 
initiated by Mohammed VI upon his ascension to the throne in 1999, bought him 
goodwill within his country and abroad as a liberalizing figure.
241
  “In Morocco, recent 
popular memories of political reform in the 1990s, a generally more liberal political 
atmosphere and a relatively new head of state… served to dilute popular rage against the 
regime.  As one of the leaders of the 20 February protest movement that emerged in 
Morocco ruefully remarked, ‘If Morocco had been a little less liberal and we had had a 
Ben Ali in power, we would be achieving so much more.”242 
On the surface, there appears to be much in common between Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Morocco in terms of the presence or lack of democratic procedures and outcomes, 
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particularly in terms of the supremacy of the ruler and his entourage and the lack of a 
well-organized (and legal) opposition movement within the Parliament.  However, the 
variations in political openness between the Moroccan monarchy and the Egyptian and 
Tunisian presidencies point to an underlying difference between these countries, which 
will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter: the Moroccan monarch, by 
virtue of being a king and being endowed with legitimacy because of his position, was 
able to use his authority in such a way that he could create the space for political change 
in a way that the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt were not able to. 
3. Religious and Monarchical Legitimacy 
 A main difference between the Moroccan regime and its counterparts in Egypt 
and Tunisia is the ability of King Mohammed to use religious legitimacy to justify his 
power over the country, while Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak did not have similar 
legitimacies that they could use to justify a continuation in their positions.  While the 
relationship between organized Islamic groups and the palace has points of contention, 
the fact remains that the king is able to use religious symbolism and rhetoric to reach out 
to his subjects – and by-pass the everyday political process – in a way that is not 
available to the region’s presidents. 
 The Moroccan king comes from a family that is believed to be descendent from 
the Prophet Mohammed.
243
  This lineage makes the king a shorfa, a term that conveys an 
honored religious status.
244
  Because of this status, the king carries dual roles as ruler of 
the political state and as the highest religious authority in the country as Amir al 
                                                 
243
 Gallala-Arndt 2012, 141 
 
244
 Hammoudi 1997, 14 
 
 63 
 
Mumineen, the Commander of the Faithful.
245
  The holder of the title of Commander of 
the Faithful assumes the function of the ‘supreme arbitrator’ – he is to arbitrate among 
competing political and social issues.
246
  Thus, the king brings together traditional Islamic 
values, such as sharia (Islamic law), ‘umma (the community of believers), and bay’a (an 
oath of loyalty) with modern institutions such as a constitution and political parties.
247
  
Because of this foundation of values, the king is able to appeal to “ethical and legal 
principles inspired by Islam” as a relief valve to quiet “grassroots movements that may 
otherwise agitate for political change through insurgency and revolution.”248  The king 
uses the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to create a monopoly over “the discourse of 
preaching in mosques, the nature of the educational system of the imams, [and] religious 
broadcasting in the radio and television,” through which his legitimacy over the religious 
establishment is reinforced.
249
  
 The king also used his position as the country’s religious leader to promote the set 
of constitutional reforms developed in response to the Arab Spring protests.  His speech 
in favor of the amendments implied that voting ‘yes’ in the referendum would help to 
make progress in the Western Sahara conflict.
250
  Furthermore, by ending his speech with 
a verse from the Quran (“This is my way: I call on Allah with sure knowledge. I and 
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whosoever followeth me”), the king suggested that voting in favor of the constitutional 
amendments was a religious duty.
251
 
 Because the king comes from a dynasty that has led Morocco for generations, he 
was able to draw upon religious values that are tied to nationalism as reasons why he 
should maintain his throne.
252
  Scholars write that, since these religious, cultural, and 
nationalist identities are tied to values that members of the society believe are beneficial, 
the appeals to them helped the king to maintain his power.
253
  While Middle Eastern 
republican leaders can attempt to draw on these values, it is much harder for them to gain 
traction with these tactics, because the history behind them is seen as being ‘invented’ by 
the ruler, not ‘authentic’ to the country.254 
Furthermore, the king has an additional level of legitimacy specifically over 
members of the military.  Because of his dual role as political and religious leader of 
Morocco, disobeying an order from the king is both a civil and religious offense.
255
  
While this religious legitimacy comes from centuries of tradition and religious doctrine, 
the royal family is able to manipulate what compliance with this legitimacy looks like; in 
particular, the current king’s father, King Hassan manipulated the religious side of the 
argument after two coup attempts in the 1970s.
256
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Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt where the militaries were professionalized – meaning 
that the military had their own systems for choosing and promoting leaders without 
undue interference from political leaders
257
 – the Moroccan military had great incentives 
to help the king to maintain his power.  The higher ranks of both the security forces and 
the military are filled with relatives and allies of the king;
258
 they are “personally invested 
in the regime’s survival.” 259  Tying these officers to the palace is a move that helped to 
prevent the military from joining in the protests against the king – there would be nothing 
for the officers to gain from this move.
260
  This is in comparison to Tunisia, where, 
scholars have argued, an Army general issued the ‘velvet shove’ – in the form of refusing 
to shoot on peaceful protestors – that forced President Ben Ali to give up his seat and 
leave the country.
261
    
The king of Morocco’s position allows him to have “more institutional and 
symbolic room to improvise reforms” than do Arab presidents.262  For a president, 
making reforms can open the office up to competition; a king can call for new 
parliamentary elections or create a prime ministership without necessarily diluting his 
own power.
263
  Unlike an Arab president, who is nominally elected, the Moroccan king 
could work on the reform process without “any hint that they were placing their own 
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positions in question.”264  Since the king is attached to a series of traditions, not all of 
which are necessarily religious in nature, he can make claims back upon these traditions 
to provide himself more time to make the reforms that the people are demanding.
265
  
Protecting so-called “sacred institutions” – which broadly includes the nation (which 
includes Western Sahara) and the monarchy, as well as Islam – was used as a reason that 
change must be small or incremental.
266
  
 In addition, the Moroccan protestors made different demands of their king than 
the Tunisians or Egyptians made of their presidents.  Calling for the king to step down 
would have been a non-starter for protestors in Casablanca.  While protestors in Tunis 
were calling for the overthrow of President Ben Ali,
267
 the best the Moroccan protestors 
could do was to call for a parliamentary monarchy and for specific reforms dealing with 
corruption and other economic issues.
268
  This careful avoidance of direct challenges to 
the king’s power occurred, in part, because of the belief that, without the king’s consent 
and involvement, the necessary reforms would not happen.
269
 
 Because of his centrality in the Moroccan political system, the king has been able 
to manage which groups are allowed into power in the Parliament.
270
  Since the groups in 
power only serve at the pleasure of the king, he has been able to manufacture a politics of 
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consensus over time; this consensual style makes challenging the king’s authority more 
difficult.
271
  For instance, the ties between the king and the political parties meant that 
none of the major parties joined in with the February 20 Movement – to do so would 
have meant possibly jeopardizing their positions in Parliament.
272
 
 Furthermore, the king used his centrality in the Moroccan political system to 
make it appear that the king, not by the protestors, inspired the reforms.  When 
announcing the constitutional reform process, King Mohammed highlighted the need to 
“revamp the economy, boost competitiveness, promote productive investment, and 
encourage public involvement,” but not the protests or the February 20 Movement.273  As 
one journalist observed during the speech: “tellingly… the words ‘parliamentary 
monarchy’ did not pass his lips.” 274 
4. Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the similarities and differences in between Morocco 
and its North African neighbors in terms of political institutions and basis for the rulers’ 
legitimacy.  In terms of political institutions and outcomes, Morocco looks similar to 
Tunisia and Egypt: power was increasingly placed in the hands of the powerful, the 
opposition did not offer much in the way of ideological distinction, and the publics were 
apathetic about the chance for political change through the normal political process. 
The king had sources of support from both of the main threats encountered by 
these regimes during the Arab Spring protests: liberal, secular elites and religious groups.  
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Toward the former, the relatively liberal reputation of the regime helped.  Toward the 
latter, the king has sources of religious legitimacy that are not available to the presidents 
of the North African republics. 
The fact that Morocco is a monarchy, and not a republic, created a different 
source of political legitimacy.  The king was able to use this legitimacy to offer reforms 
to the people, who would give him more time to propose and implement the 
constitutional changes.
 275  
 The king also had dual sources of legitimacy over the armed 
forces – as the civil and religious leader of the country – which helped him to keep the 
army from defecting and siding with the protestors.  Both of these helped to create a 
situation where the king was able to maintain his power. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 Mohammed VI of Morocco was able to draw upon the fact that he is a king to 
maintain his position after the Arab Spring protests began in his country, despite the fact 
that the king’s neighbors, President Ben Ali of Tunisia and President Mubarak of Egypt 
lost their positions as a direct result of the protests.  This difference in outcome cannot be 
understood as a result of differences in the underlying structural conditions faced by the 
countries during period leading up to the protests.  All three countries had similarly high 
levels of un- and under-employment, particularly among the growing populations of 
young and well-educated citizens; increasing economic and social inequality, in part due 
to policies that cut social safety net provisions; and well-documented economic and 
political corruption, in which those with connections to the ruler and his family increased 
their control over access to the economy. 
 Furthermore, the difference in outcomes should not be understood as coming from 
variations in regime strategies.  Both the Moroccan king and the Tunisian and Egyptian 
presidents used tactics such as “buying off” parts or all of the opposition, attempting to 
discredit the ideas that the opposition was advancing, and using their power to keep the 
opposition out of a place of institutional power.  Despite the differences in political 
institutions between the countries, these three leaders used similar tactics and policies in 
attempts to maintain their seat of power. 
 However, being a king did grant King Mohammed VI with a source of legitimacy 
that was not available to the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt.  First, the king is endowed 
with religious legitimacy because of his title of Commander of the Faithful and lineage 
 70 
 
from the Prophet Mohammed – sources of legitimacy that are not available to the secular 
leader of the other North African states.  The king’s religious legitimacy also changed the 
ways in which the military interacted with him.  Unlike the professionalized militaries of 
Egypt and Tunisia, which were not dependent upon their leader for their continued 
existence, the Moroccan military could not defy the king without being guilty of both 
treason and sacrilege. 
 The king was also able to use his legitimacy as a monarch to change the ways in 
which the protestors interacted with him.  While the protestors in Tunis and Cairo made 
claims that “the people want to overthrow the regime,”276 protestors in Casablanca and 
Rabat asked for a constitutional monarchy.
277
  The king’s central position in the 
government, and his involvement with the political and economic elites in the makhzen 
led many Moroccans to believe that constitutional change would be impossible without 
the leadership of the king.
278
  Finally, given that the king is seen as a source of stability 
against the chaos that could come from outright regime change, he is able to make 
promises of constitutional reform that presidents cannot make without undermining their 
own base of power.
279
  In the face of protestors demanding regime change, “neither Ben 
Ali nor Hosni Mubarak was able to frame an adequate defense of their right to rule,” 
while the king was able to call on the stability and tradition of the monarchy to maintain 
his right to rule.
280
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 Across the Arab world, being a monarch helped leaders to maintain power.  As of 
the spring of 2013, four Arab presidents – Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Ali Abdallah Sadeh of Yemen – lost 
their power.
281
  Furthermore, the on-going civil war in Syria calls into questions whether 
President Bashar al-Assad will maintain his power.
282
  On the other hand, the region’s 
monarchs came through the protests relatively unscathed.  In Jordan and Morocco, the 
kings used constitutional amendments to focus on immediate changes in the government.  
In oil-rich Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, the monarchs 
proactively used petro-dollars to raise the salaries of public officials, increase spending 
on welfare policies, and to create employment opportunities.  Large-scale protests did 
erupt in Bahrain – where a Sunni monarch rules over a largely Shia population – but were 
put down with the help of Saudi Arabian security forces.
283
   
Scholars argue that the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), an intergovernmental 
organization formed by the Arabian Peninsula monarch, also played a role in helping 
monarchs to maintain their power.
 284
  The monarchs leading the GCC learned from the 
failures of leaders in Egypt and Tunisia, and decided to take action to prevent a wide-
scale domino effect across the region.
285
  Once protests were seen in Jordan, the GCC 
began to fast-track that country’s application to the organization, and it extended an 
invitation for membership to Morocco.  Both of these events also came with offers, 
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specifically from the government of Saudi Arabia, for loans or reduced prices on oil 
imports.
286
   
 Whether the Moroccan outcomes can be seen as ‘good’ depends on one’s 
perspective.  From the perspective of the king, maintaining power while granting some 
constitutional reforms is a much better option that losing his power.  The king retains 
both his political and religious standings as the head of the country and, while the 
wording is changed somewhat from previous versions, he remains “inviolable” (Article 
46).
287
  The king is credited with proposing changes to the Constitution before the 
“familiar violence-mobilization cycle could kick in,” as it had in Egypt and Tunisia, 
which could have created more sympathy or support for the February 20 Movement.
288
  
Attempting to ignore the demands of the Movement, or acting too slowly to respond to 
them, would “only grant these movements a more conducive opportunity to expand and 
earn them a wider audience and more supporters.”289  
 From the protestors’ perspective, however, the constitutional changes made by the 
king in response to their agitation did not go nearly far enough – they declared that the 
new constitution was a “half-measure, heavy on inclusive rhetoric and light on actual 
reform.”290  In the years preceding the Arab Spring, not only was the palace “the heart of 
the country’s political system, but… the king and his inner circle of family and friends 
were Morocco’s most important economic actors,” and the new constitution did little to 
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change that fact.
291
  Another charge laid against the constitutional changes is that they do 
nothing to constrain the king’s power.  King Mohammed VI still retains the power under 
the Constitution to act in ways that trump other sections of the Constitution,
292
 
particularly in issue areas that deal with the monarch and his family, the nation (generally 
taken to mean issues surrounding the ‘territorial integrity’ of the country – namely, 
Western Sahara), or Islam.
293
 
 In addition to the previously mentioned dimensions of the protestors vis-à-vis the 
king, the results of the Arab Spring protests in Morocco can be thought of in terms of 
their impact on the outside world, as well of in terms of their effects on the Moroccan 
population as a whole.  In both of these instances, the events of 2011 led to a better 
outcome in Morocco than the ones experienced in Tunisia and Egypt.  The monarchy-
managed transition in Morocco meant that there was no gap in political power as there 
was in Egypt and Tunisia, when a transitional government held power, the country held 
elections, and a constitutional commission tried to write a new constitution, all during 
roughly the same time period.
294
  While the protestors did not get everything they wanted, 
particularly in terms of issues surrounding corruption, the process taken meant that 
additional immediate changes could be attempted through the day-to-day politics of 
Parliament rather than through revolutionary action. 
Morocco did not face the same problems with visitors entering the country as did 
its neighbors.  The countries mentioned are heavily dependent upon revenue from foreign 
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tourists.  While tourism revenue dropped by 6 percent in Morocco during 2011, that 
figure is not nearly as bad as the 30 percent decrease experienced in Tunisia or the 60 
percent decline in Egypt.
295
  It should also be noted that it is unclear whether the decrease 
in tourism to Morocco is because of the Arab Spring protests or because of a general 
decrease in tourism amongst citizens of the European Union because of the Great 
Recession.
296
 
 Furthermore, because the king kept his power, Morocco missed some of the 
economic or political downfalls that Egypt and Tunisia experienced or that could be 
feared if the country became chaotic due to a political vacuum.  Other than in Libya, a 
protest-driven refugee crisis never manifested itself in the long-term way feared by 
European leaders.
297
  Because Morocco also is a center of transit for migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa, stability in the kingdom also meant that the police and border control 
were as effective (or ineffective) as usual in preventing migrants from leaving Morocco 
for the European Union’s shores.298  Finally, had there been a protracted struggle between 
the protestors and the king, it is likely that the Polisario Front, the Western Saharan 
freedom fighters backed by Algeria and Mauritania, would have seized the opportunity to 
renew their fight for independence.
299
 
 While Islamists did come to power in Morocco, the PJD is relatively moderate in 
its views on politics and the role of Islam in the state.  It was highly unlikely that radical 
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Islamist groups would have gained much power in Morocco, but there was a fear, 
particularly among liberals and women’s rights activists, that the PJD’s ascent would 
create a situation in which laws more heavily based on Quranic interpretations would be 
enacted.
300
  These fears were similar to those held in Tunisia about al-Nahdha and in 
Egypt about the Muslim Brotherhood.  However, the king’s centrality in the political 
system and the traditional policy of alternation between political coalitions means that the 
Islamists will have incentives to stay more moderate, lest they risk moving too far away 
from the king’s agenda.301  Additionally, because the king maintains final control over 
the Moroccan political system, there is little worry among Western governments that the 
ruling coalition will change its stance on supporting the American-led “War on Terror,” 
unlike the anxiety produced when protests arose in Bahrain and Egypt.
302
 
 All in all, the Moroccan king was able withstand the Arab Spring protests mainly 
because of his monarchical legitimacy.  This legitimacy gave him more time to act than 
leaders in other North African countries were given – despite members of the February 
20 Movement taking issue with the constitutional amendment process and the text of 
these amendments.  In the two years since the proposal of the constitutional reforms, 
however, the country has returned to the status quo of King Mohammed VI and the 
makhzen has retained the majority of the country’s political power.  
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